Inconsistency and the dilemma of intuitionistic research in generative syntax

The paper is a contribution to the current debate on linguistic data and evidence. It raises two questions: (a) What kinds of inconsistency do emerge in generative syntax? (b) How are these kinds of inconsistency to be evaluated with respect to the workability of the syntactic theory at issue? As a first step, a system of paraconsistent logic is introduced which distinguishes between weak and strong inconsistency. While weak inconsistency is harmless, strong inconsistency is destructive. Second, a case study demonstrates that in generative syntax weak inconsistency may be a useful tool of problem solving. Third, two further case studies show that intuition as a data source triggers the emergence of strong inconsistency in generative syntax. Finally, this results in a methodological dilemma with far-reaching consequences

The Puzzle of Thought Experiments in Conceptual Metaphor Research

How can thought experiments lead to new empirical knowledge if they do not make use of empirical information? This puzzle has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science. It arises in conceptual metaphor research as well and is especially important for the clarification of its empirical foundations. The aim of the paper is to suggest a possible solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research. The solution rests on the application of a novel metatheoretical framework that conceives of linguistic theorizing as a process of plausible argumentation. The central idea of the solution is that through the dynamic feedback mechanism of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of information, thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research may indirectly supply the process of plausible argumentation with empirical knowledge

Paraconsistency and Plausible Argumentation in Generative Grammar: A Case Study

While the analytical philosophy of science regards inconsistent theories as disastrous, Chomsky allows for the temporary tolerance of inconsistency between the hypotheses and the data. However, in linguistics there seem to be several types of inconsistency. The present paper aims at the development of a novel metatheoretical framework which provides tools for the representation and evaluation of inconsistencies in linguistic theories. The metatheoretical model relies on a system of paraconsistent logic and distinguishes between strong and weak inconsistency. Strong inconsistency is destructive in that it leads to logical chaos. In contrast, weak inconsistency may be constructive, because it is capable of accounting for the simultaneous presence of seemingly incompatible structures. However, paraconsistent logic cannot grasp the dynamism of the emergence and resolution of weak inconsistencies. Therefore, the metatheoretical approach is extended to plausible argumentation. The workability of this metatheoretical model is tested with the help of a detailed case study on an analysis of discontinuous constituents in Government-Binding Theory. Keywords: generative syntax, inconsistency, paraconsistency, plausible argumentatio

Remarks on the cognitive base of pragmatic principles

The present paper aims at the exemplification of the applicability of plausibility analysis to linguistics. Starting from the criticism of Robinson (1997), the paper argues for two assumptions. Firstly, as opposed to a theory of distributed systems, it is a theory of plausible reasoning that is capable of capturing basic methodological problems of theory formation in pragmatics (such as circularity, category error, the arbitrariness of interpretations of data and the objectification of the theorist's cultural and linguistic knowledge as principles of language behaviour). Secondly, the cognitive base of pragmatic principles is inferential and plausibilistic, rather than non-inferential and probabilistic

Az adattípusok integrációjának tudománymódszertani problémái az elméleti nyelvészetben

Az elméleti nyelvészetben jelenleg éles vita folyik arról, hogy milyen adattípusok és milyen adatforrások fogadhatók el. A vita kiváltója az elméleti nyelvészet fő áramában évtizedek óta domináns szerepet játszó, az introspekcióban mint adatforrásban gyökerező grammatikalitási ítéletek megbízhatóságába vetett bizalom megrendülése. A jelen tanulmány amellett érvel, hogy bármily problematikusak is az introspektív adatok, nem iktathatók ki az elméleti nyelvészetből. Ezért az alapkérdés nem az, hogy milyen adattípussal válthatók fel, hanem az, hogy milyen módon integrálhatók egymással különböző adatforrásokból származó adattípusok az elméleti nyelvészetben. Ugyanakkor a jelenlegi elméleti nyelvészet tudománymódszertana alkalmatlan arra, hogy e kérdésre elfogadható, a nyelvészeti kutatómunka gyakorlatában alkalmazható választ adjon. A tanulmány központi feltevése az, hogy Kertész – Rákosi (2012) p-modellje lehet egy olyan újfajta tudománymódszertan egyik lehetséges (de nem az egyedül lehetséges) kiindulópontja, amely a különböző adatforrásokból származó, különböző adattípusok integrációjának igényét a jelenleginél hatékonyabban ki tudja szolgálni

Guest editors' note

The introduction of the volume by the guest editors

Whole-part and part-whole inferences in generative and cognitive linguistics

The paper focuses on the relation between the analytical philosophy of science and modular and holistic approaches to cognitive linguistics, respectively. The authors show that Chomsky's as well as Bierwisch & Lang's and Lakoff & Johnson's approaches make substantial use of non-demonstrative inferences which the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science evaluates as fallacies. By outlining a metatheoretical framework focusing on plausible inferences, the authors argue that the inferences the theories mentioned make use of are plausible rather than fallacious. This finding illuminates basic aspects of theory formation in linguistics and motivates the revaluation of the methodological foundations of linguistic theories